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In March 2017, the Supreme Court created a rare exception to a well-known evidence rule called the “no-
impeachment” rule. The rule itself states that “during an inquiry into the validity of a verdict … a juror may
not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect
of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict
or indictment”.  The rule then contains three exceptions allowing a juror to testify: (1) regarding
extraneous prejudicial information, (2) about the presence of an outside in uence that improperly
affected the jury, or (3) regarding a mistake made in entering the verdict.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has seemed reluctant to create further exceptions to this rule, doing
so only for “the gravest and most important cases” where excluding juror testimony about the
happenstance of the jury’s deliberations might violate “the plainest principles of justice”.  It is logical,
then, that a situation where a defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury might be hindered by a
juror’s racial bias could be what the Court would consider a grave violation of “the plainest principles of
justice”.  This is exactly the kind of issue that was raised to the Supreme Court in Peña-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
The petitioner in Peña-Rodriguez asked the Court to create a constitutional exception to no-
impeachment for the purpose of preventing racial bias in juries from affecting verdicts. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy declared that no-impeachment laws (both on the federal and state levels) that
totally bar testimony regarding jury deliberations are invalidated upon a  nding that a juror made a “clear
statement … [indicating] he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal
defendant”.
This new development in the law revolving around no-impeachment issues presents many big questions
for courts, and legislatures, across the country to wrestle with. For example, in a recent Sixth Circuit
case, Peña-Rodriguez was cited by the defendants seeking a new trial because of the racially insensitive
remarks made by the jury foreman.  Peña-Rodriguez established that evidence of a juror’s remarks that
show racial stereotype or animus warrant a reversal of the verdict, however, the case did little more than
this and leaves a lot up to lower court interpretation.  The court in United States v. Robinson, for
example, narrowly interprets Peña-Rodriguez, holding that the remarks at issue did not “overcome the
no-impeachment rule”.  If the remarks in Robinson were not enough for the Sixth Circuit to  nd
warranted the exception created by Peña-Rodriguez, then what would be enough?  This is one example
that showcases some of the big questions accompanying the future of the no-impeachment rule around
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the country. How severe must the racism in jury deliberations be for courts to overturn the verdict? Is
maintaining the “ nality of the jury process” really that important when the risk of doing so might result
in a defendant’s constitutional rights being infringed?  Can attorneys actually approach jurors after a
trial to ask if there was any racism going on in the jury room?
On  rst blush, the logical answer to that last question would be “no”, it would be improper for an attorney
to do that. But Peña-Rodriguez did not explicitly bar that.  In the case, jury members came forward
after deliberations to reveal the racism that had occurred, with no prodding from attorneys at all. But
some jurors may not feel so inclined to come forward.  The rami cations of Peña-Rodriguez, combined
with the Court’s previous decisions on the no-impeachment rule could lead to some tension between
allowing the jury process to have the freedom it needs and eliminating racial bias from the justice
system. In Tanner v. United States, for example, Justice O’Connor commented on the importance of
preventing juror exposure to undue harassment from the defeated party, which could in uence future
proceedings.  Yet, in Peña-Rodriguez, the Court makes clear that racial bias is a “serious, warping
in uence on a jury”.  If and when this comes into con ict, how will that contention be addressed?
This and many other big and important questions are now on the table following Peña-Rodriguez. It will
be interesting to follow the issue going forward, to watch how courts and legislatures across the country
handle this new constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule.
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